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Abstract
We propose a proof of the security of EPR-based quantum key distri-
bution against enemies with unlimited computational power. The proof
holds for a protocol using interactive error-reconciliation scheme. We as-
sume in this paper that the legitimate parties receive a given number of
single photon signals and that their measurement devices are perfect.
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution is a cryptographic task that uses properties of quan-
tum mechanics to allow two legitimate parties to share a secret random number.
This random number can be used as a key for a symmetric classical cipher to
establish a perfectly secure communication channel between the legitimate par-
ties. The first quantum key distribution protocol, called BB84, was proposed
by Bennett and Brassard [1]. It was followed by other protocols, such as [2, 3]
and the security of these protocols were analysed [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. The
unconditional security of quantum key distribution – i.e. security against en-
emies with unlimited computational power – was obtained by Mayers [12, 13]
for the BB84 protocol and many notions and techniques introduced in the proof
are used in the present paper. Other proofs of the unconditional security of
BB84 followed [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. The security of EPR-based quantum key
distribution protocol proposed by Ekert, E91 [3, 19], has also been proved
in [14, 15, 17, 20], and the security of entanglement-based quantum key dis-
tribution using untrusted apparatus has been proved in [21, 22]. In this paper,
we propose another proof of the security of E91. The protocol is proved secure
against enemies with unlimited computational power. However, it is assumed
that both legitimate parties receive an ensemble of a given number of single
photons. Furthermore we assume that the efficiency of their detection unit is
one, which is far from true in any practical implementation of quantum key
distribution today. The results in this paper therefore do not apply to practi-
cal implementations of EPR-based quantum key distribution. Nevertheless it
is hoped that techniques employed in this paper can be generalised to prove
security of practical EPR-based quantum key distribution protocols.
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2 Definition of security
We adopt the same definition of security as described in [13, 23].
The roˆle of key distribution between two distant legitimate parties, tradi-
tionally called Alice and Bob, is to generate a shared random number, called
the private key, that is guaranteed to be known only by the legitimate parties.
A non-authorised party, traditionally called Eve, should not be able to obtain
any information about the private key, whichever eavesdropping strategy she
might adopt.
However, most quantum key distribution protocols do not allow Alice and
Bob to share a private key in all circumstances. It is only when some conditions
are satisfied that Alice and Bob can ascertain a potential eavesdropper will only
have negligible information about the key. The protocol therefore provides a
validation test that tells whether a key can be generated with unconditional
privacy. A key is created only if the test is passed. Otherwise the session is
abandoned. Nevertheless, as in [13, 23] we will adopt the convention that when
the validation test is not passed, Alice chooses a random value for the private
key with uniform probability distribution. As a result, the private key is defined
regardless the outcome of the validation test, but, of course, when the validation
test is not passed, Bob does not share the key with Alice.
Finally, we consider families of protocols for which a parameter quantify-
ing the amount of a resource used in a protocol characterises its security. Such
parameter is called security parameter. Usually, the higher the security parame-
ter’s value is, the higher is the level of security, but also the amount of a resource
required by the protocol. We now give a formal definition of security.
A random variable will always be denoted by a bold letter, and values taken
by this random variable by the corresponding plain letter. Only discrete random
variables will be considered in this paper. The probability distribution of a
random variable x is denoted by Px, i.e. Px(x) = Pr(x = x) is the probability
that x takes the value x. The joint distribution of two random variables x
and y is denoted by Pxy, i.e. Pxy(x, y) = Pr(x = x,y = y). The conditional
probability of x given that y takes a value y is denoted by Px |y=y whenever
Py(y) > 0, i.e. Px |y=y(x) = Pr(x = x|y = y) = Pxy(x,y)Py(y) , whenever Py(y) is
positive. Let f be a function defined on the image of x. When no confusion is
possible, the notation f will be adopted to denote the random variable f(x).
We will denote by ~κ the random variable giving the private key generated
in a key distribution session. The key is a string of m bits where m is a positive
integer specified by the legitimate users. That is ~κ takes value in {0, 1}m.
Given an eavesdropping strategy chosen by Eve, we denote by v the random
variable giving collectively all data Eve gets during this key distribution session.
Henceforth, given the eavesdropping strategy adopted by Eve, v is called the
view of Eve, and we will denote by V the set of all values v may take.
We adopt the following definition of security for quantum key distribution
protocols.
Definition 1 Consider a quantum key distribution protocol returning a key ~κ ∈
{0, 1}m regardless the outcome of the validation test, where the length of the
key, m, is fixed and chosen by the user. We say that the protocol offers perfect
privacy if and only if:
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• the protocol is parametrised by a parameter N taking value in N called the
security parameter, and
• there exists a function ǫ : N ×N → R+ such that ǫ(N,m) is vanishing
exponentially as N grows (i.e. there exist α > 0, β > 0, Nmin ∈ N and
a function f : N → R+ such that ∀N > Nmin, ǫ(N,m) < e−αNβf(m)) ,
and
• there exists a function N0 : N → N such that, for any strategy adopted
by Eve,
∀m, ∀N ≥ N0(m),
H(~κ|v) ≥ m− ǫ(N,m)
where v is Eve’s view given her strategy, and
H(~κ|v) Def= −
∑
~κ,v : P~κv(~κ,v)>0
P~κv(~κ, v) log2 P~κ |v=v(~κ)
is the Shannon entropy [24, 25, 26] of the key ~κ given Eve’s view v.
Another important aspect of security of key distribution protocols is the in-
tegrity or the faithfulness of the distributed key. We must require that whatever
Eve does, it is very unlikely that Alice and Bob fail to share an identical private
key while the validation test is passed. However, the integrity of the protocol
depends mainly on the efficiency of the error detection/correction scheme that is
used. This point is discussed in Appendix, but the reader is referred for instance
to [27] for a more complete explanation.
3 The protocol
We describe the quantum key distribution protocol under consideration. It is a
variation [19] of the protocol originally proposed in [3]. The protocol is designed
to use classical error-reconciliation schemes like the interactive scheme proposed
in [27].
Protocol setup
Alice and Bob specify:
• m, the length (in bits) of the private key to be generated.
• ǫ, the maximum threshold value for the error rate during the quantum
transmission (ǫ < 1/4).
• τ , a security constant such that 2ǫ1−ǫ < 2ǫ1−ǫ + τ < 1.
• the security parameter r. It must be large enough so that Alice and
Bob can find a binary matrixK of sizem×r such that any linear com-
bination of rows of K that contains at least one row of K has weight
greater than dK =
(
2 ǫ1−ǫ + τ
)
r (i.e. min~x∈{0,1}m\~0(w(~x
TK)) ≥ dK
where for any vector ~y, w(~y) is the weight of ~y, that is, the number
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of non zero entries in ~y). Alice and Bob choose one such matrix K.
Shannon’s coding theorem [25] tells that for asymptotic values of m,
such matrix can be found if r obeys the inequality:
m
r
≤ 1− h
(
ǫ
1− ǫ +
τ
2
)
,
where h(ǫ) = −ǫ log2 ǫ−(1−ǫ) log2(1−ǫ) is Shannon’s binary entropy.
• An error reconciliation scheme between Alice and Bob such that:
– it tells, with high probability of correctness, whether more than
ǫs errors are present in a string of s bits, where s =
⌊
r
1−ǫ
⌋
,
– if there are less than ǫs errors in the string, the scheme corrects
these errors, at least with high probability of success,
– only positions of the errors are possibly disclosed publicly. In
particular the scheme should disclose no information about par-
ities of the reconciled string.
The error reconciliation can be a probabilistic scheme for which an
upper-bound on the probability of failure can be specified by Alice
and Bob. One can achieve such a task by first estimating the error
rate on a small randomly chosen proportion of the string and then
by using for instance the interactive error-reconciliation scheme pro-
posed in [27]. In these processes, the exchanged parities or bits should
be encrypted with the one-time pad method [7, 10]. A basic expla-
nation of this scheme can be found in Appendix A, but the reader is
referred to [27] for a complete description. The above requires that
Alice and Bob share beforehand a secret private key for the one-time
pad encryption. According to Shannon’s coding theorem, for asymp-
totic values of s, such probabilistic error-reconciliation is possible if
the entropy1 q (in bits) of the previously shared private key obeys
the inequality:
q ≥ sh(ǫ).
• n, the number of pairs of photons to be sent to the legitimate parties.
A good choice for n is
⌈
r
1−ǫ
2
−τS
⌉
where τS is a small but strictly
positive constant.
Quantum transmission
• A source sends a sequence of n photons to Alice and another sequence
of n photons to Bob. It is assumed that ideally, for each i ∈ {1 . . . n},
the source emits a pair of photons in the state:
|Φ+〉 = | 0〉+| 0〉+ + | 1〉+| 1〉+√
2
and that Alice’s i-th photon is the first photon of this pair, and Bob’s
i-th photon is the second photon of this pair. The kets | 0〉+ and
1That is, the length of the previously shared key if it is uniformly distributed.
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| 1〉+ form an orthonormal basis + of the Hilbert space describing the
polarisation of one photon. The kets | 0〉× = | 0〉++| 1〉+√2 and | 1〉× =
| 0〉+−| 1〉+√
2
form its conjugate basis ×.
However, the source needs not to be trusted. In particular, it can
be under control of a possible eavesdropper. The only assumption is
that Alice and Bob receive a sequence of n single photon signals on
each side.
• We assume that the measurement devices of Alice and Bob have
efficiency one. For each i ∈ {1 . . . n},
1. Alice picks randomly a basis ai ∈ {+,×} with uniform probabil-
ity distribution. Alice measures her i-th photon in the basis ai,
obtaining the outcome αi ∈ {0, 1}, corresponding to the state
|αi〉ai .
2. Similarly, Bob picks randomly and independently of Alice a basis
bi ∈ {+,×} with uniform probability distribution. Bob measures
his i-th photon in the basis bi, obtaining the outcome βi ∈ {0, 1},
corresponding to the state |βi〉bi .
Sifting
We denote by ~a = (a1, a2, . . . , an),~b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn), ~α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn)
and ~β = (β1, β2, . . . , βn) the outcomes of the quantum transmission. For
any vector ~y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) in {0, 1}n or {+,×}n, and for any subset
X of {1 . . . n}, we denote by yX the restriction of ~y on X .
Alice and Bob compare publicly their bases ~a and ~b. We denote by ~d the
vector in {0, 1}n such that for any i ∈ {1 . . . n}, di = 1 if and only if
ai = bi. If the number of indexes i ∈ {1 . . . n} such that ai = bi is greater
than or equal to s (i.e. w(~d) ≥ s) then the sifted set S is defined as the
set of the first s such indexes. Otherwise the validation test is failed. The
bit strings αS and βS are usually referred to as the sifted keys.
Error correction
Alice and Bob perform the error correction on their sifted keys αS and
βS as specified in the protocol setup. We define the error set E as the
set of indexes in S in which an error is found, that is, αi 6= βi. Likewise,
we define the error vector ~e as the vector in {0, 1}s giving the positions
of the errors (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, ei = 1 if and only if αi 6= βi). We denote
by e the size of the set E, i.e. e = |E| = w(~e). The validation test is
passed if e < ǫs, otherwise it is failed. If the validation test is passed, then
Alice and Bob define the reconciled set R as the set of the first r indexes
i ∈ S \E 2. Therefore |R| = r and ∀i ∈ R, ai = bi and αi = βi. Alice and
Bob obtain an identical string of bits αR ∈ {0, 1}r, called the reconciled
key.
Privacy amplification
The private key is defined as:
1. ~κ = KαR (mod 2) if the validation test is passed.
2 Note that |S \ E| ≥ r if the validation test is passed.
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2. an m-bit string ~κ picked randomly by Alice with uniform probability
distribution each time the validation test is failed.
4 Privacy of the protocol
The main result of this paper is stated.
Property 1 The protocol described above offers perfect privacy: for any eaves-
dropping strategy chosen by a possible eavesdropper, the conditional entropy of
the private key ~κ given the eavesdropper’s view v is bounded from below by:
H(~κ|v) ≥ m− 2
(
m+
1
ln 2
)(
θ(r) + 2
√
θ(r)
)
,
where
θ(r) = 2−(1−h(
1
2
− 3
16
τ)) τ2 r.
The above bound applies for any value of the security parameter r such that
the matrix K specified in the protocol exists.
The protocol uses previously shared private key for the error reconciliation.
A net gain in shared private bits is achieved if m is greater than the number
of the secret bits used during error reconciliation. For asymptotic values of m,
we can take arbitrarily small values for the security parameter and a net gain
in private bits is obtained if m > sh(ǫ) ≃ r1−ǫh(ǫ). We have seen that privacy
amplification is possible if mr ≤ 1 − h
(
ǫ
1−ǫ
)
. Therefore, a net gain in shared
private bits can be obtained for asymptotic values of m if:
1− h
(
ǫ
1− ǫ
)
− 1
1− ǫh(ǫ) > 0.
5 Proof of the privacy
5.1 Notations
We define the notations used throughout the proof.
Classical data
We denote collectively by C = (~a,~b, ~α, ~β) the classical data Alice and Bob
generate during the protocol (after the setup). Note that other variables
Alice and Bob generate during the protocol can be deterministically de-
rived from C. We denote by P = (~a, ~d, ~e) the data that are publicly
announced by Alice and Bob during the protocol. Recall that specifying
~a and ~d is equivalent to specifying ~a and ~b. For any possible P , we denote
by CP the set of values for the classical data that are compatible with the
public announcement of P . That is, for a given P = (~a, ~d, ~e),
CP = {C′ = (~a′,~b′, ~α′, ~β′) : ~a′ = ~a,
∀i, b′i = ai if di = 1, b′i 6= ai if di = 0
∀i ∈ E, α′i 6= β′i and ∀i ∈ S \ E, α′i = β′i
where S and E are given by ~d and ~e.}.
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Given a possible P and a value for the private key ~κ, we define CP,~κ as
the set of values for the classical data that are compatible with the public
announcement of P and generation of ~κ for the private key. That is, for a
given P = (~a, ~d, ~e),
CP,~κ = {C′ = (~a′,~b′, ~α′, ~β′) : ~a′ = ~a,
∀i, b′i = ai if di = 1, b′i 6= ai if di = 0
∀i ∈ E, α′i 6= β′i and ∀i ∈ S \ E, α′i = β′i
Kα′
R
= ~κ (mod 2),
where S, E and R are given by ~d and ~e.}.
Finally, we denote by P the set of all possible public announcements for
which the validation test is passed. That is,
P = {P = (~a, ~d, ~e) : w(~d) ≥ s and e < ǫs}.
For any vector ~x and any symbol A, w(~x) is the number of non-zero
entries, and wA(~x) is the number of entries with symbol A. For any vector
~x ∈ {0, 1}n, we denote by ¬~x the vector whose i-th entry is 1+xi (mod 2)
for all i ∈ {1 . . . n}. Finally, we denote by T the subset S \ (E ∪ R), and
by t the size of T .
Bell states
For each i ∈ {1 . . . n}, we define the Bell basis {| 0〉i, | 1〉i, | 2〉i, | 3〉i} of
the i-th pair of photons as:
| 0〉i = | 0〉+,i| 0〉+,i + | 1〉+,i| 1〉+,i√
2
,
| 1〉i = | 0〉+,i| 0〉+,i − | 1〉+,i| 1〉+,i√
2
,
| 2〉i = | 0〉+,i| 1〉+,i + | 1〉+,i| 0〉+,i√
2
,
| 3〉i = | 0〉+,i| 1〉+,i − | 1〉+,i| 0〉+,i√
2
,
where the first and the second state in the product states in the rhs. cor-
respond to Alice’s and Bob’s i-th photon’s polarisation state, respectively.
Tensor products are implied when we consider state of several photons,
that is, | ~α, ~β〉~a,~b = ⊗ni=1|αi〉ai,i|βi〉bi,i and |~c〉 = ⊗ni=1| ci〉i. For any sub-
set X of {1 . . . n}, |αX , βX〉aX ,bX = ⊗i∈X |αi〉ai,i|βi〉bi,i.
Given a basis a ∈ {+,×}, we define Xa as the set of indexes of Bell states
that are compatible with Alice and Bob measuring in the same basis a and
sharing the same bit value. Likewise, we define Ya as the set of indexes of
Bell states that are compatible with Alice and Bob measuring in basis a
and not sharing the same bit value. That is, X+ = {0, 1}, X× = {0, 2},
Y+ = {2, 3} and Y× = {1, 3}. Given the choice of bases ~a and a set
A ⊂ {1 . . . n}, we define XaA as {cA ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}A : ∀i ∈ A, ci ∈ Xai}
and YaA as {cA ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}A : ∀i ∈ A, ci ∈ Yai}. Given a reconciled set R
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and the choice of bases aR on R, for any cR ∈ XaR , we will denote by ~γ the
unique ~γ ∈ {0, 1}r such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, ci = (1+w×ai)γi, i.e.
ci = γi if ai = +, and ci = 2γi if ai = ×. For any vectors ~x, ~y ∈ {0, 1}r,
we define ~x · ~y as ~x · ~y Def= ∑ri=1 xiyi. Given R and aR, for any cR ∈ XaR ,
we have the identity aR〈αR, αR |cR〉 = (−1)
αR·~γ√
2
r .
5.2 Model of measurements
A mathematical model of measurements on the quantum state generated by the
source is given. The source can be under complete control of Eve, as long as
it sends n single photons to both Alice and Bob. In such a scenario, Eve may
entangle a probe of any dimension to the photons she sends to Alice and Bob
which are in any state Eve wants. We write the state of these n couples of
photons and the probe in the Bell basis as follows:
ρ =
∑
~c,~c′
|E~c〉〈E~c′ | ⊗ |~c〉〈~c′ |,
where the states |E~c〉 are states of Eve’s probe that are possibly nor orthogonal
nor normalised. The positive operator giving the probability that Alice and Bob
get C = (~a,~b, ~α, ~β) as their classical data is simply:
FC = P~a(~a)P~b(
~b)| ~α, ~β〉~a,~b ~a,~b〈~α, ~β |,
where P~a(~a) = 1/2
n and P~b(
~b) = 1/2n for any choice of ~a and ~b. Note that
P~a(~a)P~b(
~b) = P~a(~a)P~d(
~d) where P~d = 1/2
n.
The positive operator giving the probability that Alice and Bob publicly
announce P = (~a, ~d, ~e) while they get the private key ~κ is the sum of the
operators FC′ for C
′ running over CP,~κ:
FP,~κ =
∑
C′∈CP,~κ
P~a(~a
′)P~d(
~d′)| ~α′, ~β′〉~a′,~b′ ~a′,~b′〈~α′, ~β′ |
= P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)1S ⊗
∑
αE∈{0,1}e
|αE,¬αE〉aE ,aE aE ,aE 〈αE,¬αE |
⊗
∑
αT∈{0,1}t
|αT , αT 〉aT ,aT aT ,aT 〈αT , αT |
⊗
∑
αR∈{0,1}r :
KαR=~κ
|αR, αR〉aR,aR aR,aR〈αR, αR |
where 1S is the identity operator acting on the Hilbert space describing photons
not in S. Note that ~b(S) = ~a(S).
Similarly, the positive operator giving the marginal probability that Alice
and Bob publicly announce P = (~a, ~d, ~e) is the sum of the operators FC′ for C
′
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running over CP :
FP =
∑
C′∈CP
P~a(~a
′)P~d(
~d′)| ~α′, ~β′〉~a′,~b′ ~a′,~b′〈~α′, ~β′ |
= P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)1S ⊗
∑
αE∈{0,1}e
|αE,¬αE〉aE ,aE aE ,aE 〈αE ,¬αE |
⊗
∑
αT∈{0,1}t
|αT , αT 〉aT ,aT aT ,aT 〈αT , αT |
⊗
∑
αR∈{0,1}r
|αR, αR〉aR,aR aR,aR〈αR, αR |.
Eve may perform a general measurement on her probe. This general mea-
surement can take place after Alice and Bob’s public announcements and there-
fore can be conditioned on P . We will denote by VP the set of views v that are
compatible with the public announcement P . The positive operator giving the
probability that Eve gets the view v given that Alice and Bob announced P will
be denoted by Gv|P . We will assume without loss of generality that the opera-
tors Gv|P are of rank one, i.e. Gv|P = |χv|P 〉〈χv|P | where the vectors |χv|P 〉 are
possibly not orthogonal nor normalised, but obey the relation
∑
v∈VP Gv|P = 1.
5.3 The roˆle of the validation test
Here we show that it is very unlikely that the validation test is passed when
the state of the photons emitted by the source is very different from the ideal
state specified by the protocol. The underlying principle has been advanced
in [14, 17, 18]. More precisely, given a possible reconciled set R, let ΠR be the
orthogonal projection operator defined as:
ΠR =
∑
~c∈{0,1,2,3}n :
w(cR)≥dK/2
|~c〉〈~c |
= 1R ⊗
∑
cR∈{0,1,2,3}r :
w(cR)≥dK/2
| cR〉〈cR |.
The operator ΠR projects onto Bell states for pairs of photons in R with
weight greater than dK/2 =
(
ǫ
1−ǫ +
τ
2
)
r. The following property is then
proved.
Property 2 The eigenvalues of the semi-definite positive Hermitian operator∑
P∈P
ΠRFPΠR,
where R is specified by P in the sum, are bounded from above by
θ(r) = 2−(1−h(
1
2
− 3
16
τ)) τ2 r.
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Proof The above operator can be written as:
∑
P∈P
ΠRFPΠR =
∑
~d∈{0,1}n :
w(~d)≥s
∑
~e∈{0,1}s :
w(~e)<ǫs
ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR.
Now for given ~d and ~e,∑
~a
FP = P~d(
~d)1S ⊗i∈E Yi ⊗j∈T Xj ⊗k∈R Xk,
where
Xi = | 0〉〈0 |+ 1
2
| 1〉〈1 |+ 1
2
| 2〉〈2 |,
Yi = | 3〉〈3 |+ 1
2
| 1〉〈1 |+ 1
2
| 2〉〈2 |
are operators acting on i-th photon pair’s Hilbert space. The last equalities are
derived directly from the definition of the Bell states. As a consequence, we
have,
ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR = P~d(
~d)1S ⊗i∈E Yi ⊗j∈T Xj ⊗
( ∑
cR∈{0,1,2} :
w(cR)≥dK/2
| cR〉〈cR |
2w1(cR)+w2(cR)
)
.
Now, given ~d ∈ {0, 1}n, the operator:
∑
~e :w(~e)<ǫs
ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR
is diagonal in the Bell basis | c〉. Given a vector ~c ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n and an error
vector ~e ∈ {0, 1}s, a necessary condition for the scalar:
〈c |ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR| c〉
to be non zero is that, for all i ∈ S,
• ei = 0 if ci = 0,
• ei = 1 if ci = 3, and
• w1(cS) + w2(cS) ≥ e − w3(cS) + dK/2 (otherwise w(cR) is smaller than
dK/2).
10
Let k = e − w3(cS). Then there are
(
w1(cS)+w2(cS)
k
)
such vectors ~e of weight e,
if 0 ≤ k < ǫs− w3(cS) and k ≤ w1(cS) + w2(cS)− dK/2. Therefore,
〈c |
∑
~e :w(~e)<ǫs
ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR| c〉
≤ P~d(
~d)
2w1(cS)+w2(cS)
∑
0≤k<ǫs−w3(cS), and
k≤w1(cS)+w2(cS)− dK2
(
w1(cS) + w2(cS)
k
)
.
Now, dK is either greater or smaller than (w1(cS) + w2(cS))
(
1 + τ2 (1− ǫ)
)
.
• If dK > (w1(cS) + w2(cS))
(
1 + τ2 (1− ǫ)
)
, then
w1(cS) + w2(cS)− dK
2
<
1
2
(
1− τ
2
(1 − ǫ)
)
(w1(cS) + w2(cS)) and,
• if dK ≤ (w1(cS) + w2(cS))
(
1 + τ2 (1− ǫ)
)
, then
ǫs− w3(cS) ≤ ǫr
1− ǫ
=
dK
2
− τ
2
r
≤ 1
2
(
1− τ
2
(1− ǫ)
)
(w1(cS) + w2(cS)),
where we have used r ≥ s(1− ǫ) and s ≥ w1(cS) + w2(cS).
We thus derived that:
〈c |
∑
~e :w(~e)<ǫs
ΠR
(∑
~a
FP
)
ΠR| c〉
≤ P~d(
~d)
2w1(cS)+w2(cS)
∑
0≤k< 1
2 (1− τ2 (1−ǫ))(w1(cS)+w2(cS))
(
w1(cS) + w2(cS)
k
)
≤ P~d(~d)2−(1−h(
1
2 (1− τ2 (1−ǫ))))(w1(cS)+w2(cS))
≤ P~d(~d)2−(1−h(
1
2
− 3
16
τ)) τ2 r
= P~d(
~d)θ(r)
where we have used the binomial inequality stating that
∑
0≤k<pn
(
n
k
) ≤ 2nh(p)
for any positive integer n and 0 ≤ p < 1/2. In the last inequality we have used
the inequalities ǫ < 1/4 and w1(cS) + w2(cS) ≥ dK/2 when the above scalar is
non zero.
Remarking that the operator
∑
~a,~e : e<ǫsΠRFPΠR is diagonal in the Bell
basis for all ~d and
∑
~d :w(~d)≥s P~d(
~d) ≤ 1, this concludes the proof. ✷
We recall that ρ =
∑
~c,~c′ |E~c〉〈E~c′ |⊗|~c〉〈~c′ | is the density operator describing
Alice and Bob’s photons and Eve’s probe. The above property implies that:
Tr
(
1Eve ⊗
∑
P∈P
ΠRFPΠRρ
)
≤ θ(r)
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where 1Eve is the identity operator acting on the Hilbert space of the probe.
That is, ∑
P∈P
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
cR∈XaR :
w(cR)≥dK/2
〈E~c |E~c〉 ≤ θ(r).
5.4 Quasi-independence of the key and the view
In this section we compute the joint probability distribution of the key and the
view. We prove that this distribution is very close to a product of an uniform
distribution for the key and the marginal probability distribution of the view.
Property 3 For any given eavesdropping strategy chosen by Eve and returning
a view v, the probability distribution of the key ~κ and the view v obeys the
following inequality:
∑
P∈P
∑
v∈VP
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣P~κv(~κ, v)− 12mPv(v)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(θ(r) + 2√θ(r))
where m is the length of the private key and r is the size of the reconciled set.
Proof For any ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, P and v ∈ VP , we have:
P~κv(~κ, v)− 1
2m
Pv(v)
= Tr(Gv|P ⊗ FP,~κ ρ)−
1
2m
Tr(Gv|P ⊗ FP ρ)
= P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
~c,~c′ :
cE ,c
′
E∈YaE ,
cT ,c
′
T∈XaT ,
cR,c
′
R∈XaR
〈E~c′ |Gv|P |E~c〉δcR,c′Rd~κ(~γ,~γ
′),
where
d~κ(~γ,~γ
′) =
∑
αR∈{0,1}r :
KαR=~κ (mod 2)
(−1)αR·(~γ+~γ′)
2r
− 1
2m
δ~γ,~γ′ .
where we have used the identity aR,aR〈αR, αR |cR〉 = (−1)
αR·~γ√
2
r for any cR ∈ XaR .
We denote by:
• G the set of all linear combinations over {0, 1} of rows of K. It is a vector
space of dimension m.
• S a subspace of {0, 1}r that is supplement to the subspace G, that is
G ⊕ S = {0, 1}r. The dimension of S is r −m.
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• K the set of all vectors ~x ∈ {0, 1}r such that K~x = ~0 (mod 2). The set
K is a vector space of dimension r −m, since the rows of K are linearly
independent. We will denote by {~u1, . . . , ~ur−m} a basis of K.
Given a subspace F of {0, 1}r, we denote by F⊥ the set of all vectors ~x ∈
{0, 1}r such that for all ~y ∈ F , ~x · ~y = 0 (mod 2). Remark that K⊥ = G. Since
the rows ofK are linearly independent, for any ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, there exists a vector
~θ~κ ∈ {0, 1}r such that K~θ~κ = ~κ (mod 2). It follows that KαR = ~κ (mod 2) if
and only if αR ∈ ~θ~κ +K. Thus following the techniques used in [13],∑
αR∈{0,1}r :
KαR=~κ (mod 2)
(−1)αR·(~γ+~γ′) =
∑
αR∈~θ~κ+K
(−1)αR·(~γ+~γ′)
= (−1)~θ~κ·(~γ+~γ′)
r−m∏
i=1
[
1 + (−1)~ui·(~γ+~γ′)
]
=
{
(−1)~θ~κ·(~γ+~γ′)2r−m if ~γ + ~γ′ ∈ K⊥ = G,
0 if ~γ + ~γ′ /∈ G.
One obtains therefore that:
P~κv(~κ, v)− 1
2m
Pv(v) =
1
2m
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
(Uv~κcR + Vv~κcR)
†∆(Uv~κcR + Vv~κcR),
where Uv~κcR and Vv~κcR are complex vectors of dimension 2
r and ∆ is a 2r × 2r
complex matrix, whose entries are indexed by ~γ ∈ {0, 1}r. The ~γ-th entry of
Uv~κcR and Vv~κcR are:(
Uv~κcR
)
~γ
=
{
(−1)~θ~κ·~γ〈χv|P |E~c〉 if w(~γ) < dK/2,
0 if w(~γ) ≥ dK/2.(
Vv~κcR
)
~γ
=
{
0 if w(~γ) < dK/2,
(−1)~θ~κ·~γ〈χv|P |E~c〉 if w(~γ) ≥ dK/2,
where ~c is given by cR, aR and ~γ. The (~γ,~γ
′)-th entry of ∆ is:
(
∆
)
~γ,~γ′
=
{
1 if ~γ + ~γ′ ∈ G \ {0},
0 if ~γ + ~γ′ /∈ G \ {0}.
This implies U †v~κcR∆Uv~κcR = 0, since w(~γ) < dK/2 and w(~γ
′) < dK/2 imply
that w(~γ + ~γ′) < dK , that is, ~γ + ~γ′ /∈ G \ {~0}.
The matrix ∆ is Hermitian, of eigenvalues 2m − 1 and −1. There are 2r−m
eigenvectors ~v~x (~x ∈ S) associated with the eigenvalue 2m − 1. The ~γ-th entry
of ~v~x is: (
~v~x
)
~γ
=
{
1 if ~γ + ~x ∈ G
0 if ~γ + ~x /∈ G.
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There are 2r−m (2m − 1) eigenvectors ~w~x,~σ (~x ∈ S, ~σ ∈ {0, 1}m \ {~0}) asso-
ciated with the eigenvalue −1. The ~γ-th entry of ~w~x,~σ is:(
~w~x,~σ
)
~γ
=
{
(−1)~ω~γ+~x·~σ if ~γ + ~x ∈ G
0 if ~γ + ~x /∈ G.
where for any ~y ∈ G, ~ω~y is the unique vector in {0, 1}m such that KT ~ω~y = ~y
(mod 2). Note that for any ~γ ∈ {0, 1}r, there is an unique (~x, ~y) ∈ S × G such
that ~γ = ~x+ ~y, and that:
1~γ =
1
2m

~vx + ∑
~σ∈{0,1}m\{~0}
(−1)~ω~y·~σ ~w~x,~σ

 ,
where 1~γ is the canonical vector with entry 1 at position ~γ and 0 everywhere
else. We can express the vectors Uv~κcR and Vv~κcR as linear combinations of
these eigenvectors:
Uv~κcR =
∑
~x∈S
(−1)~θ~κ·~xφv,cR,~x,~κ~v~x +
∑
~x∈S
∑
~σ 6=~0
(−1)~θ~κ·~xφv,cR,~x,~κ+~σ ~w~x,~σ,
Vv~κcR =
∑
~x∈S
(−1)~θ~κ·~xψv,cR,~x,~κ~v~x +
∑
~x∈S
∑
~σ 6=~0
(−1)~θ~κ·~xψv,cR,~x,~κ+~σ ~w~x,~σ,
where for any ~z ∈ {0, 1}m,
φv,cR,~x,~z =
∑
~y∈G :
w(~x+~y)<dK/2
(−1)~ω~y·~z
2m
〈χv|P |E~c〉,
ψv,cR,~x,~z =
∑
~y∈G :
w(~x+~y)≥dK/2
(−1)~ω~y·~z
2m
〈χv|P |E~c〉.
In deriving the above formulae, we used the identity ~θ~κ · ~y = ~ω~y · ~κ (mod 2)
for any ~y ∈ G and ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m. It follows that:
V †v~κcR∆Vv~κcR =
∑
~x∈S
|ψv,cR,~x,~κ|2(2m − 1)‖~v~x‖2 −
∑
~x∈S
~σ 6=~0
|ψv,cR,~x,~κ+~σ|2‖~w~x,~σ‖2
= 2m
[
(2m − 1)
∑
~x∈S
|ψv,cR,~x,~κ|2 −
∑
~x∈S
~σ 6=~0
|ψv,cR,~x,~κ+~σ|2
]
,
thus, ∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣V †v~κcR∆Vv~κcR
∣∣∣
≤ 2m
∑
~x∈S
[
(2m − 1)
∑
~κ
|ψv,cR,~x,~κ|2 +
∑
~σ 6=~0,~κ
|ψv,cR,~x,~κ+~σ|2
]
= 2m+1(2m − 1)
∑
~x∈S
∑
~κ
|ψv,cR,~x,~κ|2.
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Similarly, we have,∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣U †v~κcR∆Vv~κcR
∣∣∣ ≤ 2m+1(2m − 1)∑
~x∈S
∑
~κ
|φ∗v,cR,~x,~κψv,cR,~x,~κ|.
Now,
∑
P∈P
∑
v∈VP
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣P~κv(~κ, v)− 12mPv(v)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
P∈P
1
2m
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
v∈VP
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
[
|V †v~κcR∆Vv~κcR |+ 2|U
†
v~κcR
∆Vv~κcR |
]
≤ 2(2m − 1)
∑
P∈P
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
v∈VP
∑
~x∈S
∑
~κ
[
|ψv,cR,~x,~κ|2 + 2|φ∗v,cR,~x,~κψv,cR,~x,~κ|
]
≤ 2(2m − 1)(η + 2√η
√
ξ),
where we used the Schwartz inequality, and where
η =
∑
P∈P
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
v∈VP
∑
~x∈S
∑
~κ
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)|ψv,cR,~x,~κ|2,
ξ =
∑
P∈P
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
v∈VP
∑
~x∈S
∑
~κ
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)|φv,cR,~x,~κ|2.
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We derive an upper-bound on η and ξ. We have:
η =
∑
P∈P
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
v∈VP
∑
~x∈S
∑
~y,~y′∈G
w(~x+~y)≥dK/2
w(~x+~y′)≥dK/2
∑
~κ
(−1)~ω~y+~y′ ·~κ
22m
〈E~c′ |χv|P 〉〈χv|P |E~c〉
=
1
2m
∑
P∈P
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
~x∈S
∑
~y∈G
w(~x+~y)≥dK/2
∑
v∈VP
〈E~c |χv|P 〉〈χv|P |E~c〉
=
1
2m
∑
P∈P
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
~x∈S, ~y∈G
w(~x+~y)≥dK/2
〈E~c |E~c〉
=
1
2m
∑
P∈P
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
cR∈XaR :
w(cR)≥dK/2
〈E~c |E~c〉
≤ 1
2m
θ(r),
using the result of the previous section. Similarly,
ξ =
1
2m
∑
P∈P
P~a(~a)P~d(
~d)
∑
cR :
cE∈YaE ,
cT∈XaT
∑
cR∈XaR :
w(cR)<dK/2
〈E~c |E~c〉
≤ 1
2m
.
Consequently,
∑
P∈P
∑
v∈VP
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣P~κv(~κ, v)− 12mPv(v)
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
(
θ(r) + 2
√
θ(r)
)
which concludes our proof. ✷
5.5 Bound on the conditional entropy
We conclude the proof of privacy by using the following property from classical
information theory.
Property 4 Let x and y be two discrete random variables taking values in the
sets X and Y respectively. Let µ be a nonnegative real number. If the following
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inequality is satisfied: ∑
x∈X , y∈Y
∣∣∣∣Pxy(x, y) − 1|X |Py(y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ,
then the conditional entropy of x given y is lower-bounded by:
H(x|y) ≥ (1 − µ) log2 |X | −
1
ln 2
µ.
Proof The hypothesis implies that there exist a set of real numbers ηx,y for
all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y such that:
Pxy(x, y) =
1
|X |Py(y)(1 + ηx,y),
(ηx,y is assigned the value zero if Py(y) = 0) obeying the inequality:∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
1
|X |Py(y)|ηx,y| ≤ µ.
Note that for all x and y, we have −1 ≤ ηx,y ≤ |X | − 1. Now,
H(x|y) = −
∑
x∈X , y∈Y : Pxy(x,y)>0
Pxy(x, y) log2 Px |y=y(x)
= log2 |X | −
∑
x∈X , y∈Y : ηx,y>−1
1
|X |Py(y) log2(1 + ηx,y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ |ηx,y|
ln 2
−
∑
x∈X , y∈Y : ηx,y>−1
1
|X |Py(y)ηx,y log2 (1 + ηx,y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤|X |
≥ log2 |X | −
µ
ln 2
− µ log2 |X |,
which concludes the proof. ✷
The probability distribution of the private key and the view obeys the fol-
lowing inequality:∑
~κ∈{0,1}m,
v∈V
∣∣∣∣P~κv(~κ, v)− 12mPv(v)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
P∈P
∑
v∈VP ,
~κ∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣P~κv(~κ, v)− Pv(v)2m
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
P /∈P
∑
v∈VP ,
~κ∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣P~κv(~κ, v)− Pv(v)2m
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2(θ(r) + 2
√
θ(r)) + 0.
where we have used the fact that the key is randomly chosen by Alice with
uniform probability distribution if the validation test is not passed. Applying
the above property for the random variables ~κ and v, we obtain:
H(~κ|v) ≥ m− 2
(
m+
1
ln 2
)(
θ(r) + 2
√
θ(r)
)
,
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which concludes the proof of privacy. ✷
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A Appendix: Error detection and correction
We describe here how we can estimate the error rate in the sifted set S and
then correct the discrepancies between Alice’s and Bob’s sifted keys using the
interactive error-reconciliation scheme [27].
Estimation of the error rate The error rate in the sifted set can be esti-
mated by comparing a small proportion of the bits chosen randomly in
the sifted key. The compared bits should be encrypted with the one-time
pad method so that a potential eavesdropper learns only the positions of
the errors. A probabilistic property such as the Hoeffding inequality can
be used to show that the observed error rate in the sampled proportion
is not considerably lower than the error rate in the remaining part of the
sifted set [13, 16, 23]. For asymptotic size of the sifted set, one can take
arbitrarily small but positive proportion of the sifted key for this error
rate estimation.
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Error correction The remaining part of the sifted set that was not sampled
in the previous step must be corrected. One-way linear error-correcting
codes can be used for error correction. However, they are not very effi-
cient and considerably higher number of redundant bits are required than
the Shannon limit. A practical interactive correction scheme, devised by
Brassard and Salvail [27] gets closer to this theoretical limit. A basic
description of the scheme follows:
Alice and Bob group their bits into blocks of a given size, which has to be
optimised as a function of the error rate. They exchange information about
the parity of each block over the public channel. These parities should be
encrypted using the one-time pad method. If their parities agree then
they proceed to the next block. If their parities disagree, they deduce
that there was an odd number of errors in the corresponding block, and
search one of them recursively by cutting the block into two subblocks
and comparing the parities of the first subblock: if the parities agree
then the second subblock has an odd number of errors and if they do
not, then the first subblock has an odd number of errors. Again, these
parities should be encrypted. This procedure is continued recursively on
the subblock with an odd number of errors. As a result of the encryption
of the exchanged parities, a possible eavesdropper learns only the positions
of the errors [7, 10].
After this first step, every considered block has either an even number
of errors or none. Alice and Bob then shuffle the positions of their bits
and repeat the same procedure with blocks of bigger size (this size being
optimised as well). However, when an error is corrected, Alice and Bob
might deduce that some blocks treated previously now have an odd number
of errors. They choose the smallest block amongst them and correct one
error recursively, as before. They proceed until every previously treated
block has an even number of errors, or none.
Similar steps follow, and the interactive error correction terminates after
a specified number of steps. This number is to be optimised in order to
maximise the probability that no discrepancies remain and, at the same
time, minimise the number of bits used for the one-time pad encryption.
Readers are referred to the original paper [27] for precise description and
treatment of this scheme.
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